Poetic Justice

Introduction

This ‘book review’ is in truth long overdue. I suppose I can offer the usual excuse about work commitments and personal matters. However, truth, as they say, can sometimes be far stranger than fiction. So let’s save that for a more fitting occasion.

I will indulge in this confession however – I was actually looking for every excuse not to write this post. Principally, for two reasons – firstly, I wanted to do justice to the book given my previous comments and secondly, I wanted to see if my views remain unchanged after immediately reading the book. So with that confession out of the way, let us move onwards with my ‘review’ of Syed Akbar Ali’s Malaysia & The Club of Doom. (“the Book”)

The Review Proper

The Book, as the writer himself puts it, is simply a collection of his observations and his opinion of how things are in Malaysia. And on that score, Syed Akbar Ali does not pull any punches and is evident from the following:

• From the outset, the author asserts rather revolutionarily that it may not necessarily be good sense for Islamic countries to do things “their way”, usually according to some religious format. More so, when it is clear that such formats can’t work from day one. This assertion is repeated in a number of places throughout the Book and is clearly intended to challenge the popular notion that problems can be resolved merely by reinventing everything in a religious format. In short, the cure to all ills in life is not necessarily to be gained by larger doses of religion. In its stead, particularly in the public sphere, secularism is suggested as a viable alternative. As a sub set of that, religion should also be less intrusive in people’s daily lives.
• Beyond the religious-secular debate, however, Syed Akbar also endorses a revolution of the Malaysian Muslim “tidak apa” (don’t care) mind set saving particular venom for those do not practice good hygiene and those who abhor work. Needless to say, space is also reserved for Malaysia’s administrative system.
• Similar attention is also given to the culture of violence, hate and anger said to be endemic amongst those who profess the religion of Islam. Taking centre-stage within this topic – Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, the cartons about Prophet Muhammad printed in a Danish newspaper and all manner of conspiracy theories which attract the very sentiments which attract negative publicity about Islam.
• Muslims suffering from a state of intellectual stasis as a result of their unquestioning acceptance of the views of scholars even when it defies rational belief.
• The syndrome of denial that religionism is the root of all evil. Here the author points out that the Islam and Quran is the solution as, if properly appreciated, it is a way of life.
• The so called Clash of Civilizations (i.e. Western/Christian Civilization vs. Islamic Civilization) only stems from a misunderstanding that there are no commonalities between the two.

The above represents a conspectus of the challenges faced by Muslims (and to a certain extent, even those faced by non-Muslims) and is merely a bird’s eye view of the matters canvassed in the Book. There is in fact much more covered in the Book.

While I do not necessarily agree with each and every assertion made in the Book, I think once there is proper appreciation of the author’s perspective and purport, his servings becomes more palatable. Even so, as I have previously expressed on Walski’s website, I have some relatively minor quibbles with the Book. Still, to be fair to the learned author, those comments were made prior to purchasing and reading the Book.

All in all, the Book deserves a read. Principally as it serves up a timely reminder against embracing religionism or the dogmatic application of Islam. The fact the Book also kindly provides this gem from that great servant of knowledge, the late Professor Datuk Syed Hussein Alatas:

“Jangan kita jijik pada perkataan akal, seolah-olah akal bertentangan dengan wahyu. Akallah yang membedakan hadis palsu dari hadis besar, sunah palsu dari sunah benar, tafsir salah dari tafsir benar, fikiran maju dari fikiran buntu, pendapat sesat dari pendapat tepat, kupasan mendalam dari kupasan cetek, fikiran gigih dari fikiran lembap, dan ucapan merendah diri dari ucapan angkuh.”

which in English means:

“Let us not detest the word reason (akal) as though reason is contradictory to revelation (wahyu). It is reason that separates the false hadith from the true hadith,the false sunnah from the true sunnah, the wrong interpretations from the correct interpretations, progressive thinking from retarded thinking, deviant opinion from wise opinion, in depth analysis from shallow analysis, robust thought from weak thinking and humble speech from arrogant speech.”

is merely icing on the cake.

But as the author notes (rather wryly) in Chapter 5, “… a lot of Muslim people will most likely get upset with …” the Book. I do not know about them, but I think when the Book merely sets out to remind Muslims that there is islam (“peace”) in Islam and it is a way of life, how upset can Muslims truly get?

In that sense, though I do not know the author personally, the author comes across – neither as a liberal Muslim nor as a fundamentalist Muslim (as the author stresses he is) – but as a Muslim sans the need for an adjective. As should be the case.

Matters Previously Left Unanswered

There are two other things that I which to address in relation to this post and my comment on Walski’s website. The first is in relation to the poser that I made in my comments on Walski’s website specifically – What is influencing the thinking of those ulamas (“religious officials”) who are “bad hats”?‘ A subject which I coincidentally promised Meriza Anna that I would address.

NOTE/IMPORTANT: This question is only directed at pointing out why SOME ulamas are “bad hats”. I unequivocally accept that SOME ulamas are beneficial. (For the detractors even on this score, we can get into a discussion on this some other time.)

Anyway, the question is premised on the notion that just as with any other “profession”, religious personalities exists as either the good, the bad or the ugly. There are a number of reasons why there is this (unwanted) class of ulama and they are as follows, though by no means exhaustive:

• Improper appreciation of the width that can exist to the textual sources of Islam caused by factors beyond the religion itself. E.g. poor education, cultural or racial prejudices etc.; and
• Inability or refusal to appreciate the possibility of such width due to intra-religion factors. E.g. Syiah or Sunni schism, Wahhabism or Salafism.

NOTE (2) : Some Islamic scholars like Fazlur Rahman have postulated that the hadith anchors the width to be accorded in interpreting the Quranic verses and I echo his sentiments save that aqal (reason) plays a primary role when carrying out such tasks.

In order to appreciate the points made in the bulleted points above, Khaled Abou El Fadl’s careful recounting of the rise of the Wahhabi or Salafi ideology in The Place of Tolerance in Islam bears repeating:

“In the late eighteenth century, the Al Sa’ud family united with the Wahhabi movement and rebelled against Ottoman rule in Arabia. The rebellions were very bloody because the Wahhabis indiscriminately slaughtered and terrorized Muslims and non-Muslims alike … In 1818, Egyptian forces under the leadership of Muhammad Ali defeated this rebellion and Wahhabism seemed destined to become another fringe historical experience with no lasting impact on Islamic theology. But the Wahhabi creed was resuscitated in the early twentieth century under the leadership of ‘Ab al-’Aziz ibn Sa’ud, who allied himself with Wahhabi militant rebels known as the Ikhwan, in the beginnings of what would become Saudi Arabia. Even with the formation of the Saudi state, Wahhabism remained a creed of limited influence until the mid-1970s when the sharp rise in oil prices, together with aggressive Saudi proselytizing, dramatically contributed to its wide dissemination in the Muslim world.

Wahhabism did not propagate itself as one school of thought or a particular orientation within Islam. Rather, it asserted itself as the orthodox “straight path” of Islam. By claiming literal fidelity to the Islamic text, it was able to make a credible claim to authenticity at a time when Islamic identity was being contested. Moreover, the proponents of Wahhabism refused to be labeled or categorized as the followings of any particular figure including ‘Abd al-Wahhab himself. Its proponents insisted that they were simply abiding by the dictates of al-salaf al-salih (the rightly guided predecessors, namely the Prophet and his companions), and in doing so, Wahhabis were able to appropriate the symbolisms and categories of Salafism.

Ironically, Salafism was founded in the early twentieth century by al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida as a liberal theological orientation. To respond to the demands of modernity, they argued, Muslims needed to return to the original sources of the Qur’an and Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet) and engage in de novo interpretations of the text. By the 1970s, however, Wahhabism had succeeded in transforming Salafism from a liberal modernist orientation to a literalist, puritan and conservative theology. The sharp rise in oil prices in 1975 enabled Saudi Arabia, the main proponent of Wahhabism, to disseminate the Wahhabi creed under a Salafi guise, which purported to revert back to the authentic fundamentals of religion uncorrupted by the accretions of historical practice. In reality, however, Saudi Arabia projected its own fairly conservative cultural practices onto the textual sources of Islam and went on to proselytize these projections as the embodiment of Islamic orthodoxy.”

The second matter which I wish to address is the other poser – When was the high watermark of spiritual knowledge in Islam? This assumes that there was a so called “high spiritual watermark” in Islam.

In response to that assumption, I can do no better than to set out what Muhammad Asad said in relation to the notion of legal flexibility of statecraft in his book The Principles of State and Government in Islam:

“An objection to this claim of legal flexibility might thus be made: ‘Were not those Great Companions of the Prophet better acquainted with the innermost aims of Islam than we could ever be? Is it not, therefore, absolutely necessary to follow their example as closely as possible in matters of statecraft as well? Did not the Apostle of God himself urge us to model our behaviour on that of his Companions?’

…

It is true that the Prophet has impressed on us the necessity of taking his Companions as an example: not only because they had spent many years in the Master’s company and were thus fully aware of his ways, but also because the character and behaviour of some of them attained to incomparably high levels.

However, our moral obligation to try to emulate the great Companions relates precisely to their character and behaviour – to their spiritual and social integrity, their seflesness, their idealism, and their unquestioning surrender to the will of God. It cannot and does not relate to an imitation, by people of later times, of the Companions’ procedure in matters of state administration – for the simple reason, pointed out above, that this procedure was in many respects an outcome of time-conditioned requirements and individual ijtihad, and did not in each and every instance depend on Syariah ordinances alone.”

Clearly, spiritually and morally, there was broadly speaking a high watermark. However, for other subject matters, Islam remains receptive to the ever-questing intellect of Man.

Conclusion

For those who have had the courage and patience to read this far, you have my humble thanks. That said, I must thank Walski for highlighting the contents of the Book on his website and prompting (arm twisting sounds closer to the truth) me to purchase the same. Any error contained in this post is entirely my own. God knows best.

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